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People generally assume that others are more influenced than the self (the third person 
perception or TPP).  To further understand this perception, we investigated people’s 
intuitive understanding of how persuasion works. Participants rated themselves or 
others on traits reflecting risk and immunity from persuasion (e.g., weak- and strong-
mindedness) and need for cognition (NFC).  They then rated how much they or others 
would be influenced by some advertisements.  Results showed that participants 
associated perceived low NFC and high levels of weak-mindedness with influence.  
Perceived self-other differences in these variables mediated the TPP.  Also, perceived 
NFC explained the role of self-enhancement in the TPP.  People’s intuitive 
understanding of persuasion therefore resembles the elaboration likelihood model on the 
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Why I am less persuaded than you:  People’s intuitive understanding of the psychology 
of persuasion.   
Persuasion is an inescapable feature of life.  Each day people are confronted 
with commercial advertising, political propaganda and public education programs 
attempting to influence their opinions and behavior.  Researchers have made great 
strides in understanding the psychological processes underlying persuasion.  In turn, 
they have achieved many valuable insights into how persuasion attempts are most 
effectively formulated and resisted (Cialdini, 2001; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).  However, 
for all psychologists know about persuasion, they know less about the sense that people 
make of this important social phenomenon.  What motives, thought processes, and 
intuitive concepts affect observers’ judgments of messages’ persuasive power, and 
conversely, of persons’ susceptibility to persuasion?  The present report is intended to 
enrich scientific accounts of persuasion by casting some light on people’s intuitive 
understanding of the psychology of persuasion. 
Research has already shown that certain persuasion behaviors – such as 
resistance of persuasion attempts, or efforts to protect others from persuasion – are 
shaped by intuitive persuasion beliefs.  For example, researchers have shown that some 
individuals more than others think they are personally invulnerable to the influence of 
advertising.  Ironically, this belief renders these individuals less likely to resist influence 
(Sagarin, Cialdini, Rice & Serna, 2002).  Conversely, individuals who believe others to 
be highly vulnerable are more likely to take a censorial stance toward the media, 
apparently in an attempt to protect others (Gunther, 1995).  These findings illustrate 
how a comprehensive psychological account of persuasion processes, and their wider 
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social ramifications, therefore requires an account of commonsense representations of 
those processes.   
The largest and most influential program of research into people’s perceptions of 
persuasion has been the work on third-person perceptions (TPP: Davison, 1983; see also 
Paul, Salwen & Dupagne, 2000).  The TPP is the tendency for people to believe that 
others will generally be more persuaded than themselves by an influence attempt.  It is a 
robust phenomenon having been demonstrated in over 106 studies to date (Sun, Pan & 
Shen, 2008).  The TPP has also been demonstrated in a wide variety of contexts such as 
politics and news media (e.g., Cavazza & Mucchi-Faina, 2008; Hoorens & Ruiter, 1996; 
Perloff, 1989), pornography (e.g., Gunther, 1995; Reid, Byrne, Brundidge, Shoham & 
Marlow, 2007) and most notably in advertising (e.g., Duck, Terry & Hogg, 1995; 
Gibbon & Durkin, 1995; Tal-Or, 2007).  These perceptions seem to stem, in part, from 
an illusion of personal invulnerability – individuals are persuaded by some messages 
without being conscious of any change in their attitudes (Douglas & Sutton, 2004; 
2008).  Thus, consistent with Sagarin et al. (2002), it appears that individuals may 
complacently expose themselves to persuasive messages such as advertising, oblivious 
to the effects that they are having.   
A long-standing explanation for third-person perceptions is that being easily 
persuadable is intuitively linked to undesirable traits such as gullibility.  According to 
this account, assuming that others are more persuadable than the self enhances self-
esteem and feelings of personal control are enhanced by assuming that others are more 
persuadable than the self (David & Johnson, 1998).  This can be likened to the process 
of downward social comparison whereby people compare themselves to people who are 
less fortunate or able than themselves (Wills, 1981).  Supporting this account, TPPs 
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tend to be stronger among individuals high in self-esteem (e.g., Perloff, 1989), and 
internal locus of control (e.g., Haridakis & Rubin, 2005).   
In the present study however, we consider how TPPs may arise not only from 
these self-serving processes, but also people’s intuitive psychological understanding of 
persuasion processes.  These intuitive theories have not been examined before despite 
their potential impact on persuasion judgments and behaviors.  At a general level, it is in 
the nature of human beings to engage in psychological theorizing.  People constantly 
wonder about psychological states and traits, and invoke these psychological constructs 
in explanations of their own and others’ behavior (Heider, 1958; Malle, 2004).  In doing 
so, they make use of culturally shared assumptions and intuitive theories about human 
psychology (Fletcher, 1995; Levy, Chiu & Hong, 2006; Wegener & Petty, 1998).  It is 
reasonable to assume that people do the same to attempt to understand how persuasion 
works.   
What are perceived to be the psychological traits that are related to persuasion? 
If we want to know how people understand persuasion, we may begin with what 
we, as scientists, already know about persuasive processes.  As a starting point we 
therefore turn to one of the most prominent academic theories of persuasion – the 
Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).  Based on research 
testing the principles of the ELM, we know that factors such as need for cognition 
(NFC; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) determine the extent to which people are influenced by 
different types of persuasive media (e.g., Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein & Jarvis, 1996; 
Haddock, Maio, Arnold & Huskinson, 2008).  In particular, individuals who are high in 
NFC – “the tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful thought” (Briñol & Petty, 2005, p. 
581) – tend to be persuaded by central cues in persuasion attempts, such as scientific 
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evidence and strong arguments.  However, people who are low in NFC often appear to 
be more susceptible to peripheral cues –features of a message that do not typically 
provide logical or empirical grounds to accept the central argument of a message (see 
Petty & Wegener, 1999 for a full account of the ELM).  Typically (but not always), 
these are cues such as the attractiveness of a model, slogans or the slickness of graphical 
design.  Such cues are often used as powerful persuasion techniques in many types of 
advertising.  In the present research, we investigate whether people’s intuitive 
understanding of persuasion resembles the ELM in one key respect.  Specifically, we 
investigate whether perceived NFC is negatively related to perceived susceptibility to 
persuasive advertisements that contain peripheral cues.   
One reason to assume that there may be a resemblance between people’s 
intuitive understanding and scientific theories of persuasion is that the theorizing of 
academic psychologists is likely to be influenced by the intuitive wisdom provided by 
the culture in which they grew up (Fletcher, 1995).  Further, people appear to test 
intuitive explanations of behavior with less formal analogues to the procedures used by 
scientists such as analysis of variance (e.g., Sutton & McClure, 2001).  Implicit 
understandings that generate highly inaccurate predictions in everyday life are unlikely 
to prosper (e.g., Read & Marcus-Newhall, 1993).  Therefore, both commonsense and 
scientific theories of behavior are related, albeit to varying degrees of reliability, to 
psychological facts.   
Also, with respect to TPP, we already know that people perceive others as more 
affected than the self by messages containing weak argumentation (White, 1997) 
suggesting that people’s judgments of self-other differences in persuasion are informed 
by perceptions of the message itself.  Further, Andsager and White (2007) argue that 
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people may use “an internalized set of judgment rules” (p. 113) about people when they 
estimate message impact on the self and others.  For example, they may judge people as 
differentially persuadable to the self because of their social group membership.  So, 
when judging the extent to which the self and others are persuaded, people may indeed 
use some implicit knowledge about persuasion and how persuasive processes may differ 
for the self versus others.   
People’s intuitive understanding of persuasion may therefore also not be 
restricted to NFC and other constructs from scientific psychology.  To further examine 
people’s intuitive understanding of persuasion, we therefore also consider the traits that 
people freely generate when they think about the characteristics that make people at 
risk, or immune from the influence of persuasive messages.  Obtaining these 
participant-driven characteristics is, we argue, an important step in understanding how 
people understand the persuasion process.  In the present study we therefore investigate 
whether personal characteristics linked to perceived risk of being influenced by 
advertising are positively associated with perceived susceptibility to persuasive 
advertisements, and if characteristics linked to perceived immunity from the influence 
of advertising are negatively associated with perceived susceptibility to persuasion.    
Do beliefs about these psychological traits explain the TPP? 
We also investigate the role of people’s intuitive understanding of persuasion in 
the TPP.  If persons tend to see themselves as less at risk, more immune and higher in 
NFC than others, then these perceptions have the potential to help explain the TPP.  One 
reason to suspect that self-other differences in these variables will emerge is that they, 
too, are self-serving.  Being at risk or vulnerable to influence is an undesirable trait that 
people may be more likely to ascribe to others than themselves, in much the same way 
 9
they assume that others are generally more at risk of negative outcomes in life (e.g., van 
der Pligt & Richard, 1994; Weinstein, 1987).  Further, engaging in effortful thought is 
culturally valued such that people attribute above mid-point levels of NFC to 
themselves; indeed self-reported NFC is positively correlated with self-esteem (Osberg, 
1987) and self-efficacy (Elias & Loomis, 2002).  Therefore, perceived self-other 
differences in risk, immunity and NFC could explain the TPP, so long as these variables 
are linked in people’s minds to resistance to persuasion.   
Do beliefs about these psychological traits explain why the TPP is self-serving? 
These differences could also help explain the statistical relation between third 
person perceptions and indices of positive self-perception.  That is, one way in which 
the TPP may enhance positive self-perception could be due to self-enhancing judgments 
about one’s own cognitive processes such as NFC.  That said, self-enhancement 
motives are not the only reason why individuals may see themselves as higher in these 
desirable traits than others. With reference to NFC specifically, individuals have greater 
access to their own thoughts, and therefore to occasions on which they personally were 
motivated to think, engaged in effortful thought and enjoyed thinking. This 
introspection illusion (cf. Pronin, Berger, & Molouki, 2007) may lead people to 
attribute higher NFC to themselves.  If so, and if people link NFC to resistance to 
persuasion as we are predicting, then self-other differences in NFC may help explain the 
TPP beyond the effects of positive self-perception.  A similar process may be at work 
for people’s perceptions of their own and others’ invulnerability to persuasion.  People 
may be able to recall many situations in which they have been invulnerable to attempts 
to influence their behavior, but will not have the same access to that information for 
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others.  So, irrespective of the positive value ascribed to invulnerability, people may see 
themselves as more invulnerable and therefore less persuaded than others.   
In the present experiment we asked undergraduate participants how much each 
of several advertisements would affect themselves or other undergraduate students.  
These advertisements employed peripheral cues rather than direct arguments in favor of 
the advertised products.  We used a between-groups design to determine whether the 
predicted TPP (lower perceived influence on self than on others) is mediated by 
perceived traits indicating risk and immunity from influence, and NFC. Specifically, we 
predicted that individuals would tend to rate themselves as higher than other 
undergraduates in NFC, immunity factors, and lower in risk factors.  We further 
predicted that perceived immunity and NFC would be negatively related to perceived 
influence to persuasion, whereas perceived risk would be positively associated with 
perceived influence to persuasion.  Finally, we examined the interplay between people’s 
intuitive understanding of persuasion and positive self-perceptions.  If people’s implicit 
understanding of persuasion helps explain the TPP independently of these perceptions, 
then perceived NFC, risk and immunity should mediate the TPP even when indices of 
positive self-perception are controlled for.  Further, if an understanding of persuasion 
processes helps explain why third person perceptions are self-enhancing, then self-other 
differences in perceived NFC, risk and immunity should mediate the relationship 
between those positive self-perceptions and the TPP.   
Method 
Pilot study 
In order to generate the characteristics that are perceived to make individuals 
vulnerable and invulnerable to influence, one hundred undergraduate psychology 
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students (70 female and 30 male, mean age = 24.5 years) answered the following 
question: “In your opinion, what is different about people who are persuaded by 
advertising compared to people who are immune to advertising?”  Participants’ 
responses typically mentioned traits related to both persuasion and immunity.  For 
example, one participant wrote: “I think that people more easily persuaded by 
advertisements are more weak of mind than those that aren’t, i.e. not as mentally 
strong.”  Responses were content analyzed by two raters tallying the number of times a 
particular trait was mentioned.  The two raters reached complete agreement that the four 
most commonly identified traits identified for people who are persuaded by advertising 
were vulnerability, being uncritical, weak-mindedness and impressionability.  The four 
traits identified for people who are immune to advertising were strong-mindedness, 
independence, intelligence and critical thinking.  These eight characteristics were 
included as dependent measures in the main study.   
Main study 
Participants and design 
Participants were 132 undergraduate students from a university-wide participant 
pool of non-psychology students (82 women, 50 men; mean age = 23.4 years).  As non-
psychology students the participants were naïve in terms of their knowledge about 
psychological theories of persuasion.  They participated in return for entry into a prize 
draw to win one of four £50.00 (~ US$80.00) prizes.  Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of two experimental conditions (rated person: self or other).   
Materials and procedure 
Participants first rated either themselves (self condition), or other undergraduate 
students (“other undergraduate students in your class” – other condition) on the traits 
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identified in the pilot study.  That is, participants were asked to rate to what extent they 
see themselves (or others) as vulnerable, uncritical, weak-minded, impressionable, 
strong-minded, independent, intelligent, and a critical thinker (0 = not at all, 6 = very 
much).  A factor analysis with Promax rotation identified two separate but inter-
correlated factors, r(131) = -.32, p < .001.  The traits of strong-mindedness, 
independence, intelligence and critical thinking loaded on one factor (eigenvalue = 2.53, 
proportion of variance = 31.64%).  The traits of vulnerability, being uncritical, weak-
mindedness, and impressionability loaded on the second factor (eigenvalue = 1.38, 
proportion of variance = 17.23%).  For our further analyses, we therefore calculated 
mean totals for the two trait factors, which we named weak-mindedness (α = .71) and 
strong-mindedness (α = .60).   
Next, participants were asked to rate either themselves (α = .88) or others (α = 
.88) on Cacioppo, Petty & Kao’s (1984) 18-item need for cognition scale.  This scale 
included statements such as “Thinking is not my [other undergraduate students’] idea of 
fun” and participants were asked to rate how much each statement was characteristic of 
themselves (1 = extremely uncharacteristic to 5 = extremely characteristic).   
To measure perceived influence of persuasive material on self and others, 
participants next viewed six color advertisements for a range of everyday products (e.g., 
fast food, soda and cell phones).  These advertisements were chosen from an original 
pool of 20 advertisements which were pre-tested for familiarity and gender neutrality.  
These advertisements were also selected on the basis that they used typically peripheral 
cues to persuasion, such as celebrities and attractive models, rather than providing direct 
information about the product.  Specifically, the advertisements contained no text other 
than the product name and therefore included no additional information about the 
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product to induce deeper processing.  As is typical in TPP research (see Paul et al., 
2000), participants then rated how much they thought that each advertisement would 
influence themselves or other undergraduate students, depending on the condition (1 = 
not at all, 7 = very much).   
We then measured participants’ self-perception.  All participants rated 
themselves on Schwarzer and Jerusalem’s (1995) nine-item self-efficacy scale (α = .82) 
which included statements such as “I can handle whatever comes my way”.  Participants 
were asked to indicate how much each statement was true of themselves (1 = not at all 
true to 4 = exactly true).  Participants’ general self-enhancement was then measured by 
Taylor and Gollwitzer’s (1995) 21-item self-perception scale in which all participants 
rated themselves in comparison with the average university student of their age and 
gender on a series of characteristics such as originality, creativity and individuality.  
Participants were asked to rate themselves compared to others from -3 = much worse to 
3 = much better (α = .89).  Another index of positive self-perception was provided by 
Rosenberg’s (1965) 10-item self-esteem scale which included statements such as “I feel 
that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others”.  Participants were 
asked to rate their agreement with each statement from 1 = not at all, 5 = very much (α 
= .88).  At the conclusion of the experiment, participants were debriefed and thanked.   
Results 
What are perceived to be the psychological traits that are related to persuasion? 
 As predicted, higher perceived levels of weak-mindedness predicted greater 
perceived influence, ß = .384, t(131)= 4.75, p
 
< .001.  That is, collapsed across target 
(self/other), the more people perceived a recipient to be psychologically at risk of 
persuasion, the more they thought they would be persuaded by the advertisements.  
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Higher perceived levels of strong-mindedness predicted lower perceived influence, ß = 
-.351, t(131)= -4.28, p
 
< .001.  Similarly, higher perceived levels of NFC predicted 
lower perceived influence, ß = -.564, t(131) = -7.79, p
 
< .001.  Therefore, participants 
made the predicted associations between psychological traits and persuasion, thus 
demonstrating some implicit knowledge of the link between psychological traits and 
susceptibility to influence.  
Do beliefs about these psychological traits explain the TPP? 
We conducted a one-way between-groups analysis of variance on the total   
perceived influence ratings for self and others across the six advertisements. As 
predicted, participants rated others (M = 3.03, SD = 1.22) as more influenced by the 
advertisements than the self (M = 1.53, SD = 1.03), F(1, 131) = 58.05, p
 
< .001, η2 = .31, 
replicating the third-person effect.   
We then examined if an understanding of the psychological traits linked to 
persuasion can explain this TPP.  Participants rated themselves lower on weak-
mindedness than other undergraduate students on the combined trait items from the pre-
test (Mself  = 2.33, SD = .75, Mother = 3.01, SD = .71), F(1, 131) = 28.54, p < .001, η2 = 
.18.  On the other hand, they rated themselves higher on strong-mindedness than other 
undergraduate students, (Mself  = 4.45, SD = .65, Mother = 3.70, SD = .77), F(1, 131) = 
36.51, p < .001, η2 = .22.  As predicted, participants also judged themselves as being 
higher in NFC (M = 3.80, SD = 0.59) than other undergraduate students (M = 2.89, SD = 
0.57), F(1, 131) = 84.26, p
 
< .001, η2 = .39.  For all mediation tests, target (-1 = self, 1 = 
others) predicted perceived influence at Step 1 of Baron and Kenny’s (1986) procedure, 
ß = .556, t(131) = 7.62, p
 
< .001.  We then examined if the TPP is mediated by 
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perceived weak- and strong-mindedness as generated by participants in the pre-test, and 
perceived need for cognition as derived from the ELM.   
Target (self-other) predicted perceived weak-mindedness at Step 2, ß = .424, 
t(131) = 5.34, p
 
< .001.  Step 3 showed that the self-other difference in perceived 
persuasion was significant but lower than in Step 1, ß = .48, t(130) = 6.04, p
 
< .001.  
Step 3 also showed that independently of target, perceived weak-mindedness was 
positively related to perceived influence, ß = .181, t(130) = 2.29, p
 
= .024, Sobel z = 
2.10, p = .035.   
Target predicted perceived strong-mindedness at Step 2, ß = -.468, t(131) = -
6.04, p
 
< .001.  Step 3 showed that the self-other difference in perceived persuasion was 
significant but lower than in Step 1, ß = .501, t(130) = 6.10, p
 
< .001.  However, Step 3 
showed that when target was taken into account, perceived strong-mindedness was not 
inversely related to perceived influence, ß = -.116, t(130)= -1.42, p
 
= .159 and therefore 
did not mediate the TPP.   
Target predicted perceived NFC at Step 2, ß = -.627, t(131) = -9.18, p
 
< .001.  
Step 3 showed that the self-other difference in perceived persuasion was significant but 
lower than in Step 1, ß = .332, t(130) = 3.75, p
 
< .001.  Step 3 also showed that 
independently of target, perceived NFC was inversely related to perceived influence, ß 
= -.356, t(130) = -4.02, p < .001, Sobel z = 3.68, p
 
< .001.    
These results confirmed the relevance of people’s intuitive understanding of 
persuasion, to perceived susceptibility to messages which rely upon typically peripheral 
cues.  Notably, we replicated these results when all indices of self-perception were also 
included at all 3 steps (specifically, general self-enhancement, self-esteem, and self-
efficacy).  Both perceived weak-mindedness (Sobel z = 2.22, p
 
= .027) and perceived 
 16
NFC (Sobel z = 3.41, p
 
< .001) remained as partial mediators of the TPP.  Therefore, 
perceived self-other differences in weak-mindedness and NFC contributed to the third-
person perception independently of self-serving perceptions.  Factors associated with 
immunity from persuasion (perceived strong-mindedness), on the other hand, did not.   
However, when all three potential mediating variables (perceived weak-
mindedness, strong-mindedness and NFC) were entered at Step 3, only NFC remained 
as a significant predictor of self-other differences in perceived persuasion, ß = -.346, 
t(127)= -3.39, p = .001, Sobel z = 3.10 p = .002.  Both perceived weak- (ß = .108, 
t(127)= 1.35, p = .179) and strong-mindedness ß = .013, t(127)= .048, p = .586 were no 
longer significant.  This finding suggests that, from the variables tested in this 
experiment, perceived NFC is the most relevant to people in predicting their own and 
others’ susceptibility to persuasion.   
Do beliefs about these psychological traits explain why TPPs are self-serving? 
We then examined the relationship between general self-enhancement and the 
TPP.  To do this we used a moderated regression procedure (Aiken & West, 1991) 
examining the ability of an interaction term (target, -1 = self, 1 = others, multiplied by 
mean-centered self-enhancement) to predict persuasion over and above the main effects 
of target and self-enhancement. The interaction term was marginal, ß = .126, t(128)= 
1.73, p
 
= .087, permitting only a modest level of confidence that general self-
enhancement augmented the TPP.  A similar procedure showed that self-esteem was not 
a moderator of the TPP, ß = .081, t(128) = 1.10, p = .272.  In contrast, self-efficacy was 
a significant moderator of the TPP, ß = .182, t(128) = -2.55, p = .012.  People with high 
self-efficacy committed the TPP more so than participants who were low in self-
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efficacy (see Figure 1).  This supports theorizing from previous literature about the role 
of TPPs in enhancing positive self-perception.   
We then examined the relationships between positive self-perceptions and self-
other differences in perceptions of weak-mindedness and NFC.  We did so to examine if 
either of these variables, which appear to predict self-other differences in perceived 
persuasion at least separately, mediate the relationship between self-efficacy (and other 
indices of self-enhancement) and the TPP.  To do so, we first regressed positive self-
perceptions (self-enhancement, self-esteem and self-efficacy) separately on self-other 
differences in weak-mindedness and NFC (target, -1 = self, 1 = others, multiplied by 
weak-mindedness, and NFC respectively).    
The self-other difference in perceived weak-mindedness was only marginally 
augmented by general self-enhancement, ß = -.152, t(131) = -1.93, p = .056, non-
significantly by self-esteem, ß = -.098, t(131) = -1.242, p = .216, and only marginally by 
self-efficacy, ß = -.145, t(131) = -1.84, p = .068.  When all three variables were entered 
simultaneously, none moderated self-other differences in perceived weak-mindedness.  
Therefore, perceived weak-mindedness was not a significant mediator of the effect of 
self-enhancement on perceived influence.   
The self versus others difference in perceived NFC appeared to be augmented by 
general self-enhancement, ß = .206, t(131) = 3.10, p
 
< .001, self-esteem, ß = .192, t(131) 
= 2.84, p
 
< .001, and self-efficacy, ß = .246, t(131) = 3.80, p
 
< .001.  When these three 
variables were entered simultaneously, neither self-esteem nor general self-
enhancement affected self-other differences in perceived NFC (both t < 1).  Only self-
efficacy moderated this difference, ß = .201, t(128)= 2.18, p = .031. 
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We then conducted Step 3 to test whether perceived NFC mediates the 
relationship between self-efficacy and the TPP.  The significant relationship between 
self-efficacy and self-other differences in perceived persuasion from Step 1 was no 
longer significant, ß = -.045, t(130) = -.60, p
 
= .548.  Step 3 also showed that 
independently of self-efficacy, perceived NFC was inversely related to perceived 
influence, ß = -.553, t(130) = -7.39, p < .001.  Therefore, perceived NFC fully 
accounted for the relationship between self-efficacy and the TPP, Sobel z = 5.36, p
 
< 
.001 (see Figure 2).   
Discussion 
To our knowledge, this study comprises the first examination of the types of 
information that people may draw upon when they make judgments about their own, 
and others’ susceptibility to persuasion.  We found that people make intuitive judgments 
about persuasion based on the extent to which they perceive themselves and others as 
weak-minded, and also the extent to which they perceive themselves and others as high 
in need for cognition – the tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful thought.  Further 
analyses revealed however that of these two constructs, perceived NFC emerged as the 
most significant predictor of self-other differences in persuasion.   
These results demonstrate that people’s intuitive understanding of persuasion 
therefore resembles an established theoretical model of persuasion (the ELM) in a key 
respect.  Specifically, perceived NFC is related to perceived resistance to persuasion by 
advertisements which rely on typically peripheral cues.  This gives psychological and 
evaluative meaning to resistance and susceptibility to persuasion, helping explain why 
individuals are motivated to see themselves as less influenced than others.  Of course it 
is important to note that people may not necessarily be able to articulate their 
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understanding of this link between NFC and persuasion.  For example, it is unlikely that 
people would be able to invoke NFC as a construct in everyday life because it is 
unlikely to be readily accessible, unlike features such as intelligence and critical 
thinking.  Also, it is important to note that we only tested people’s responses to glossy 
advertisements here and did not focus on direct persuasive arguments – such stronger 
arguments are likely to be seen to appeal more to people high in NFC.  Future research 
may examine the effects of central cues to persuasion, such as argument quality, on 
judgments of persuasion.  It may also be useful to consider peripheral and central cues 
as a more abstract category of persuasive evidence where the relevance of the evidence 
to people who are high and low in NFC, rather than the nature in which it is delivered, 
is important in determining persuasion (Erb & Bohner, 2007; Kruglanski & Thompson, 
1999).  Further, it will be useful to examine people’s lay use of the tenets of other 
prominent theories of persuasion.  For example, the heuristic-systematic theory of 
persuasion proposes that people process messages either systematically by analyzing 
message content, or through the use of short cuts or heuristics (Chaiken, Liberman & 
Eagly, 1989).  Whether people show an implicit awareness of such processes, or 
processes implicated by other persuasion theories, remains to be tested.  Nevertheless, 
our results suggest that people may possess an implicit understanding of a key 
psychological factor – NFC – and its importance to persuasion. 
In ongoing work, we have shown that the intuitive link between NFC and 
perceived persuasion has many of the functional characteristics of a bona fide theory.  
For example, people invoke NFC to predict and explain the extent to which other 
individuals are influenced by persuasive material, and also apply this understanding 
when tailoring persuasive messages, using more central and fewer peripheral cues for 
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audiences high vs. low in NFC (Sutton, Douglas, & Stathi, 2009).  Future research will 
further endeavor to provide a clearer understanding of the ways in which people apply 
their implicit understanding of persuasion processes.   
Further, our results revealed that the intuitive link between NFC and persuasion 
is sufficient to explain third person perceptions above and beyond the effects of positive 
self-perception.  According to previous theory and research, TPPs arises because people 
have a basic desire to see themselves positively in comparison to others, and to preserve 
their self-esteem (e.g., Perloff, 1989).  In our study, we found no evidence for the self-
esteem buffering effect of the TPP.  Instead, self efficacy significantly moderated the 
TPP.  Of course, which form of positivity regarding the self is related to the TPP is 
likely to depend on the content of the persuasion attempt.  In our study, consumer 
choices were at stake rather than, say, susceptibility to hate messages where self-esteem 
is likely to be more relevant.  Nevertheless, in this experiment the power of self-efficacy 
to predict perceived self-other differences in persuasion was driven largely by the extent 
to which people saw themselves (versus others) as high in need for cognition.  This is 
further evidence pointing to the importance of people’s implicit understanding of 
persuasion in determining judgments about their own and others’ responses to 
persuasive attempts.  It also suggests that the way in which third person perceptions 
enhance positive self-perception is due to self-enhancing judgments about one’s own 
cognitive effort.   
In addition to the novel findings of our research, we should also highlight a 
methodological strength of our study.  To our knowledge, the present results comprise 
the first demonstration of third person perceptions when the self and others are rated in 
a between-groups design.  This shows that the TPP does not depend on allowing 
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participants to anchor their ratings of others on their ratings of the self (or vice-versa), 
and is therefore unlikely to depend on demand characteristics.  Similarly, participants 
were not able not base their judgments of their own NFC on their judgments of others’ 
(or vice versa).  This gives us confidence that our findings are not merely an artifact of 
demand characteristics but instead reveal an underlying link between people’s 
judgments of effortful thought and persuasion.   
Understanding the dynamics of persuasion in everyday life requires that we, as 
psychologists, understand the sense that lay people make of these processes.  This 
research provides the first evidence that people do indeed use their intuitive 
understanding of persuasion and the personal characteristics associated with persuasion, 
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Figure captions 
Figure 1.  Self-efficacy moderates the third-person effect.  Perceived self-other 
differences in persuasion are augmented at higher levels of self-efficacy.   
Figure 2.  The relationship between self efficacy and perceived differences in influence 
for self and others is fully mediated by perceived self-other differences in need for 
cognition.   
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